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We welcome Tad Tietze’s recent work building upon the political legacy of Peter 
Sedgwick (Tietze, this issue) [[citation has now been added; should more 
of his work be cited?]]. Both Tietze and ourselves have been part of the recent 
resurgence of interest in Sedgwick, especially the relevance of his work to the politics 
of mental health. While our response here is quite critical, we are keen to be rowing 
in the same ‘Sedgwickian’ direction. 
Although it is gratifying that Tietze calls us ‘key inheritors’ of Sedgwick’s legacy, 
it is important to note that our own work is as much influenced by feminism as it is 
by socialism. Tietze is right to point to Sedgwick’s support of the seminal ‘Beyond 
the Fragments’ conference of 1979, which led to the book of the same name shortly 
afterwards, an intervention that remains a stem text of socialist feminism today 
(Rowbotham et al, 1980). It is certain that Sedgwick was held in high esteem by 
many key socialist feminists of the time, yet the feminist influence is mostly absent in 
his work. This leads to our first concern: if our admiration for Sedgwick is this side 
of idolatry, we detect a certain reverence in Tietze, which is antithetical to Sedgwick’s 
own open-ended socialism. A few examples will illustrate what we mean.
Sedgwick on anti-psychiatry
Tietze rearticulates Sedgwick’s critiques of the ‘great male minds’ of anti-psychiatry 
(Foucault, Goffman, Laing and Szasz), critiques which, it has to be said, are initially 
very persuasive. Yet, while these critiques remain required reading, they do need 
reappraisal today.
Sedgwick had fun debunking R.D. Laing’s mostly incoherent dalliance with the 
New Left of the 1960s. With typical courage, he also castigated the 1971 Laing-
inspired Ken Loach film Family life – courageous because of Loach’s own left-wing 
credentials. But none of this should distract from the brilliance of Laing’s The divided 
self and Self and others (Laing, 1960, 1966); nor should we minimise his penetrating 
appropriation not just of Jean-Paul Sartre’s early existentialism (in Being and nothingness; 
Satre, 1943) but also of his later Marxist ‘turn’ (in the Critique of dialectical reason; Satre, 
1960; Laing and Cooper, 1971).
Sedgwick’s critique of Goffman is skilful but does basically just reiterate the previous 
objections of Gouldner’s (1970) The coming crisis of Western sociology – that behind 
Goffman’s incisive re-descriptions of ‘deviance’ (classically in Asylums; Goffman, 1961) 
lurks a radical chic that is more apparent than real and employs an impoverished 
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concept of resistance to power. In Psychopolitics, Sedgwick (1982) makes great play 
with Goffman’s ‘methodological localism’ but it is easy to re-read this, not as the 
indictment that Sedgwick intends, but as a signifier of Goffman’s micro-sociological 
credentials. Indeed, Goffman’s concern with micro-politics remains an important tool 
for research into mental health precisely because it is within interpersonal encounters 
that more structural social relations are experienced, especially by those subjected 
to psychiatric power.
Thomas Szasz was tellingly revealed by Sedgwick as a methodological individualist 
(and a social Darwinist). Szasz seems to have thought that his favoured epistemology, 
which he derived from Karl Popper, led automatically to a political philosophy of 
right-wing libertarianism and the most minimal strategy of state interventionism. 
As a socialist, Sedgwick was right to condemn Szasz’s position, and Tietze is right 
to highlight this. But, again, this is not the end of the story. Serious reappraisals of 
Szasz’s work have found his tenacity in opposing the oppressions of psychiatry and 
at least some aspects of his ‘psychomedical dualism’ – the insistence upon a strict 
separation of medicine and psychiatry – worth preserving.1 We have more to say 
about this separation in the closing section of this response.
The case of Foucault is more complex because Sedgwick did not live long enough 
to evaluate some of Foucault’s later work on psychiatry in the now translated Collège 
de France lecture series of the 1970s, where the concern with psychiatric power 
intermingles with neoliberal strategies of the state or what Foucault (2008) called 
‘governmentality’. Although Left-inspired scholars have often critiqued Foucault, 
many have also sought to appropriate his insights about the power–knowledge 
stratagems of modernity into the Marxist tradition and that appropriation remains 
important for the theory and practice of ‘psychopolitics’.
So, to sum up this section of our response, we would say that Tietze provides a good 
exposition of the central arguments of Sedgwick’s (1982) critique in Psychopolitics. 
Given Tietze’s work and our own, we think that Sedgwick’s continued relevance to 
the politics of mental health is now firmly established. But we do detect an over-
reverence in Tietze, a hankering after the one-true authentic rendition of Sedgwick. 
We want to caution against this tendency and would not want Sedgwick’s open-ended 
socialism to be crystallised into dogma. That is why we take his central critiques as 
a point of departure rather than the final word.
This brings us to Tietze’s criticisms of our own work (Cresswell and Spandler, 
2009) where we attempt to appraise Sedgwick’s contribution in the light of recent 
developments, especially psychiatric survivor activism (the importance of which 
Sedgwick himself underestimated at the time). 
Tietze’s critique
Tietze mounts two specific critiques of our work that we would like to respond to. 
First, regarding our attempts to historicise Sedgwick’s focus on an illness/disease 
paradigm by stressing, rather, a trauma/abuse/distress paradigm, Tietze (this issue: 
0000) [[page number to be added at proof stage]] claims that we have elided 
how:
Sedgwick explained … that ‘however illness is specified from culture to 
culture, the attribution of illness appears to include a quest for explanation….’ 
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Even if illness is reframed as ‘trauma/abuse/distress,’ as long as individuals seek 
to address their suffering through engagement with some kind of treatment 
process, the shift entailed in the renaming of their problems is at most a 
move away from dominant biotechnological medical paradigms…. Their 
critical rejection of mainstream psychiatry’s illness claims is thus coupled 
to uncritical belief that a terminological change breaks beyond socially 
constituted conceptions of health and illness in general.
There seem to be a number of confusions evident here. The first concerns how we 
understand ‘renaming’ manoeuvres (illness>trauma) as aspects of political activism. 
The key point we would emphasise is that the social construction manifested in the 
practice of ‘renaming’ human experience is not somehow epiphenomenal to social 
reality but constitutes it, alongside all other aspects of that reality. According to this 
view, the paradigm shift signified by the move illness>trauma is a form of what 
Crossley (2006) calls ‘linguistic subversion’ – it is part and parcel of a ‘repertoire 
of contention’ of activism alongside equally important non-linguistic practices. By 
implying that linguistic subversion is somehow epiphenomenal to the ‘real’ ontology 
of ‘health and illness in general’, Tietze is in danger of misrepresenting activism in 
mental health as a merely linguistic affair. Renaming experience is not just an academic 
exercise in textual deconstruction, but directly followed activism in the mental health 
field that was rooted in feminist and psychiatric survivor activism. This can be seen 
historically in the self-harm and hearing voices movements.
We detect in Tietze’s account a rather reductionist and deterministic Marxism. This 
type of approach separates the ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ and sees all the action that 
matters as being causally located in the ‘base’ (where ‘health and illness in general’ 
apparently reside) and everything else (the ‘superstructure’ including language) as 
epiphenomenal. We far prefer the flexible thinking of Sedgwick himself and the 
tradition of what has recently been called ‘open’ Marxism. To paraphrase Marx, the 
task is to continually analyse the rich totality of many social determinations in each 
new historical situation. This holds for the analysis of psychopolitics today.
This relates to the second critique of our work.
Tietze contends that we favour Szasz’s ‘psychomedical dualism’ over Sedgwick’s 
‘unitary’ concept of illness in so far as ‘physical medicine and psychiatry are 
qualitatively different because determinations of health and illness are directly bound 
up with the … coercive imposition of treatment in psychiatry’ (Tietze, this issue: 
0000). [[page number to be added at proof stage]] Tietze finds this unsustainable 
on two grounds:
First, much of psychiatric practice has for decades expanded well outside 
the narrow remit of locked-ward practice…. Second, their claim does not 
acknowledge the wide range of coercive practices in physical medicine.… 
From the impossibility of ‘informed consent’ … to the informally non-
consensual treatment of seriously ill patients in emergency and acute medical 
settings, to the use of various legal instruments like ‘guardianship’ orders to 
impose treatment and control on patients….
The problem here is that Tietze is introducing a dualism of his own, devising then 
deploying it to buttress his argument. True, it is no longer psychomedical dualism 
page 4
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but, rather, a polemical dualism, which tries to win the argument by insisting that 
the reader must be either (a) a believer in the incommensurability of psychiatry and 
medicine like (allegedly) us and Szasz, or (b) a believer in their ‘unitary’ identity like 
Sedgwick and Tietze. Yet what unites Sedgwick and Szasz, despite their political 
differences, is the way in which they mobilise ‘ideal-types’ to motivate their analyses. 
For Szasz, the ideal-type is ‘psychomedical dualism’; for Sedgwick, it is the ‘unitary’ 
concept of illness. Ideal-types, following Weber (1978), represent an epistemological 
model of social reality (not reality itself). They are useful as tools of comparative 
analysis because they enable us to ask empirically relevant questions such as: ‘In 
what way does social reality diverge from the ideal-type?’ The downside is that they 
can become theoretical ‘givens’, even ‘ideologies’ that can never be questioned. E.P. 
Thompson (1978) once referred to this process as ‘theoretical imperialism’ – the 
shoe-horning of real-world observations into preconceived theoretical categories. 
Indeed, one of Sedgwick’s most important criticisms of the so-called ‘anti-psychiatrists’ 
was their tendency to slot psychiatric sufferers into the general case offered by the 
latest radical-sounding ideology of the time, at the expense of the specific needs and 
circumstances of individuals concerned.
Rather than positing another opposition, we suggest that Szasz and Sedgwick’s 
ideal-types inhabit two ends of a spectrum: complete incommensurability of psychiatry 
and medicine (Szaszian) at one end, and ‘unitary’ identity (Sedgwickian) at the other. 
This kind of approach enables us to address Tietze’s questions concerning the contrast 
between psychiatry and medicine without succumbing to dualism. Armed with this 
approach, we can respond to Tietze’s objections as follows.
First, while it is undoubtedly true that much of psychiatric practice has expanded 
well outside the narrow remit of locked-ward practice, we do not think that this 
invalidates our claims. Deploying our approach we would say that if forensic 
psychiatry seems to be situated towards the Szaszian end of our spectrum, then, let 
us say a consultation with a general practitioner over lack of sleep and ruminations of 
worthlessness is closer to a similar consultation for physical illness. There are elements 
of commonality in the comparison but also differences. Indeed, exerting such control 
over ideal-types is important for our own research into, for example, deliberate self-
harm and accident and emergency departments. In this example, the discriminatory 
practices to which self-harmers have been historically subjected suggest a marked 
contrast to the treatment, say, of a road traffic victim or someone who suffers from 
a myocardial infarction although all occur within a general medical setting. Again, 
the flexible approach deployed lends itself to a nuanced analysis of both sameness and 
difference within psychiatry and between psychiatry and general medicine.
Second, while we do not deny the existence of coercive practices in physical 
medicine, again Tietze’s analysis of psychiatry and general medicine is being shoe-
horned into the theoretical armoury of Sedgwick’s ‘unitary’ concept of illness. Given 
the approach we advocate, we would rather suggest that such contrasts be empirically 
investigated. For example, the use of Community Treatment Orders in the United 
Kingdom, introduced in the revision to the Mental Health Act in 2007, could be 
contrasted with ‘safeguarding’-related decisions driven by the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005. Once more, the analysis would be nuanced, emphasising both sameness 
and difference. The theoretical and empirical aspects of the analysis would exist in 
dialectical relation and not as a way of shoe-horning social reality into preordained 
theoretical categories. 
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To conclude, we welcome Tietze’s continued commitment to Sedgwickian 
psychopolitics. But, we think that Sedgwick’s work should be treated as a point of 
departure rather than a terminus for analysis and political action. It is a stem text, 
for us, not a blueprint. We welcome discussion – open-ended, of course – about the 
issues raised by Tietze’s paper and our response.
Note
1 See the special issue of Asylum magazine devoted to an appraisal of Szasz’s work (Asylum, 
2013).
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